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In the last few years, there has developed a
large literature, sometimes referred to as Ihe
"new public finance," providing a quantitative
analysis of a number of traditional problems
within the field. This paper is concerned with
surveying, or interpreting, what can be learned
from this literature; and our belief is that it has
taught us a greal deal. We concern ourselves
here not so much with the derivation of precise
formulae, e.g.,foroptimal lax rates, but with the
more general lessons which have emerged.
Some of these are of a philosophical sort—how
we ought lo think about designing tax structures;
some are of a negative sort—pointing out falla-
cies in traditional arguments or the lack of gen-
erality of previous results; finally, some are of a
positive sort—deriving the conditions under
which a particular tax structure or provision
would be desirable. We shall present an example
of each type of lesson in turn.
I. The Philosophic Basis of tbe
New Public Economics
Two strands may be identified in the recent
literature. The first is explicitly normative—it
lakes some criterion, usually the utilitarian ob-
jective of maximizing the sum of utilities; makes
some assumptions about the structure of the
economy, including Ihc set of instruments avail-
able to the government; and then derives from
them some propositions concerning the optimal
tax structure,' It explicitly recognizes the
second (or third) best nature of ihe problems
being discussed; indeed, this literature probably
represents the most significant body of work in
"second best economics." This is important,
because, as we shall show later, much common
reasoning on tax problems is based on a mis-
application of firsl besi economics.
The problem of taxation in an economy such
as ours is viewed as a problem of indirect conlrol
of imperfectly observable variables (see, for in-
stance, A. Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976); the
government, for instance, might like to exempt
"necessary" medical expenses, but finds it diffi-
cult (costly) to distinguish between these and
"unnecessary" medical expenses; we might like
to have an ability tax (which presumably would
be nondistortionary). but we can only observe
income, a compound of ability and effort; we
might like to distinguish between wage and
capital income in the unincorporated sector, but
there is no obvious way of doing so; we might
like to tax the output "automobile services" but
it is much less expensive to monitor the inputs
(gasoline and new cars).
This way of looking at tax problems is impor-
tant because much of what otherwise might
appear to be capricious, distortionary. or in-
equitable may at least make sense, and perhaps
even be judged to be desirable.
The utilitarian framework has the advantage
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of providing a simple, unified, reasonably flex-
ible ethical basis for judging among tax systems;
for instance, by positing social welfare functions
with different degrees of elasticity of substitu-
tion among ihc utilities of individuals, one can
consider, at the one extreme, ihc Rawlsian
criterion of maximizing the utility df the woxsi
off individual, and al the other, the Benthamite
criterion of adding up utilities. The traditional
approach has involved "listing" criteria, e.g..
horizontal equity, vertical equity, administrative
costs, without providing any criterion for trad-
ing off among these objectives.
In fact. Ihe principle of hnrizonlal equity, at
least as it has usually been formulated as equal
lax treatment of equals [ex post equality, as
opposed to ex ante equality, where they all have
the same chance.s), is inconsistent with utilitar-
ianism; i.e.. in a wide variety of cases, maximiz-
ing the sum of (expected) utilities necessitates
random taxation (Stiglitz 1976a); as a practical
matter, this might provide a justification for the
random enforcement of taxes. It perhaps should
be emphasized thai this result is not an oddity:
the conditions under which random taxation
would be desirable are reasonably weak (e.g..
with separable utility functions, all that i.s re-
quired is greater than unity risk aversion). The
traditional "concavity argument." e.g.. of
Ahba Lerner and Paul Samuelson (i.e.. that be-
cause of diminishing margintil utility, social
welfare is increased by equating incomes of
people who are otherwise the same) fails in the
context of the second best problems on which the
new economics focuses.
The second strand in the literature is more
descriptive in character. !t shares with the first
strand its concern for the general equilibrium
analysis prevalent in the earlier literature and its
emphasis on "distortionary" analysis—^its be-
lief, or in the case of the empirical work, its
verification thai many of the relevant elaslicities
in ihe economy are far from zero (see Boskin.
1977. James Heckman 1974 and Martin Feld-
stein 1975). This is iniportant: not only are the
quantitative effects misjudged by assuming zero
elasticities or ignoring general equilibrium ef-
fects, but the qualitative aspects of the desirable
tax structure may be altered. For instance, an
inheritance tax may well—when account is
taken of the effects of the tax on saving, the
effecl of saving on the long-run capital stock,
and the effect of the capital stock on the distribu-
tion of incomes—increase the degree of inequal-
ity in the wealth distribution rather than decrease
it (Sliglitz 1966); even apart from the capital
accumulation effecl il may increase the degree of
inequality in consumption (Sliglitz 1976); the
social security system may similarly have ad-
verse effects (Feidsicin 1974); the elimination of
ihc provisions for charitable deduction may well
decrease total expenditures on public type
goods {Boskin 1976a and Boskin and Feld-
stein 1977).
The concern for the general equilibrium ef-
fects of a tax policy has led to the introduction or
reemphasis of at least Iwo concepts in assessing
alternative programs. Stiglitz. arguing that, al
least in many cases, the capital accumulation
effects of a tax can be offset by government
monetary policy, has suggested the use of
"balanced growth path incidence analysis"
(i976b); in analogy to Richard Musgrave's
use of balanced budget analysis, the capital
labor ratio, rather than national income or the
budget, is held constant. Feldstein has. how-
ever, demonstrated that the size of some pro-
grams, in panicular social security, is so large
thai its effects cannot be easily offset by mon-
etary policy.
The other concept, the use of which is now
written into law, is that of tax expenditures: the
loss of re venue due to a particular provision. We
have three major objections to this concept.
First, as presently fomiulaied. the measurement
of foregone revenue implicitly assumes zero
elaslicities; the estimates of aggregate tax ex-
penditures are correct only when one conienv
plates eliminating (///deviaiions from taxing real
economic income simultaneou.sly and if the fac-
tors of production are in perfectly inelastic
,vH/7/j/v (which Boskin 1977 and Heckman 1974.
among others, demonstrate is not the case).
Further, the estimates for particular so-called tax
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preferences are often extremely inaccurate. For
example, if the tax law allows a deduction for
charitable contributions, it is not correct to argue
that abolishing the deduction will increase lax
revenue by (the summing over all contributors
who itemize deductions) the product of the mar-
ginal tax rale and the amount currently given to
charity. The amount of resources flowing into
each such "tax expenditure" category reflects
the tax treatment of that category as well as
others. Since the charitable deduction reduces
the price for a dollar of charitable contributions
from $1 to $( I - t), where t is the marginal tax
rate, any price elasticity at all in charitable giv-
ing would imply that abolishing the deduction
would aLs(» reduce charitable contributions. Take
the case of a family with a margmal tax rate of
20% which currently gives $300 a year to
charity. The tax expenditure budget counts .2
times $300, or $60, as a tax expenditure. Yet
abolition of the deduction implies a 25 percent
price increase; with the elasticity of — 1.2 esti-
mated by Feldstein (1976), contributions fall to
$210. and at the other extreme the "revenue
foregone" is only $42 if the extra .S90 does not
flow into taxable income. The tax expenditure
budget thus overestimates ihe revenue loss by
more than 40 percent! While il may not be in-
accurate to argue that abolition of some prefer-
ences would increase taxable income by the
amount now assumed in the tax expenditure
budget, in many cases it is likely to be very inac-
curate. For example, it would be heroic to
as.sume that "full" taxation of capital gains
would increase taxable income by anywhere
near the tax expenditure budget's estimates.
Second, as pointed out recently by Feldstein
(1975b) government spending on an activity
such as charity may decrease private spending on
the commodity. The rationale for the lax ex-
penditure budget is that the government could
collect Ihe foregone revenue and spend it on the
"preferenced" commodity directly; it is ob-
vious, however, that if each government dollar
crowded out a private dollar, a nonzero pure sub-
stitution elasticity implies that the government
would have to spend more than iheir estimated
revenue loss to provide the equivalent total ex-
penditure on the commodity. Third, the tax ex-
penditure concept suffers from a further defect:
the legislation implicitly assumed thai the
"natural" tax base is income, broadly defined;
as we shall argue below, there is little justifica-
tion for this. Thai is, to know what is being
"exempted" from taxation one needs to know
what "ought" to be taxed. By using income
defined in a broad way. the legislation focuses
discussion on particular aspects of the tax code.
(For instance, one might also argue that the fail-
ure to allow depreciation on human capital is a
negative tax expenditure. See Boskin. 1976b.)
The recent quantitative literature has also em-
phasized the importance of looking al the de-
tailed structure of the tax code. For instance,
because of the interest income exemption, the
relevant marginal cost of capital for a corpora-
tion may be significantly different from Ihe
average cost; indeed, in the absence of uncer-
tainly and with the appropriate depreciation
provision,- the corporation tax would be nondis-
tortionary (equivalent to a pure profits tax); in
some cases, the marginal cost of capitai might
even be less than the before tax rate of interest.
(See Stiglitz, 1973). With true economic depre-
ciation, a corporalion lax wiihout interest in-
come exemption would also be nondistorlionary
(sec Samuelson, 1964; for a summary, see Stig-
litz, 1975). These aspects of ihe lax structure
only become clear upon a detailed quantitative
analysis.
II. Choice of the Tax Base
One of the most controversial issues in the
literature on public finance is the choice of the
tax base. The issue takes on a number of forms:
a) The breadth of the tax base: Should in-
come be broadly defined, and special treatment
of medical expenses, charily, etc. be eliminated?
b) Consumption versus income: at least
since Fisher, there has been widespread senii-
I^n this case, equivalent to immediate write off of the
investment.
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ment among academic economists that con-
sumption provided a better base than income.
c) Negative incomes tax versus specific
subsidies (e.g.. for food, housing, etc.). One of
the contributions of the recent literature (see
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976) is its emphasis that
subsidies and taxes are really symmetrical, and
therefore the question of the correct "subsidy
base" is really the same as the question of the
correct "tax base."
Much of the conventional wisdom on this—
that the consumption tax is desirable because it
does not interfere with the intertemporal alloca-
tion of income (the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption today and tomorrow
remains the same as the marginal rate of trans-
formation) and the subsidies on food and
housing are inefficient in distorting the alloca-
tion of expenditure among commodities—is
only correct under certain conditions; the argu-
ment tbat fewer distortions are better than more
distortions is simply wrong. Faced with a
second-best problem, the use of first-best wel-
fare economics may lead to seriously erroneous
conclusions: a detailed analysis ofthe problem,
taking account of the other distortions in the
economy, is often necessary.
For example. Atkinson and Stiglitz have
shown that if the utility function is .separable
between labor (leisure) and goods, if the source
of inequality is in ability, and if the consumption
tax is chosen optimally, then the consumption
tax is the only tax to be imposed; there should be
no commodity taxation and no taxation of inter-
est income. If an optimal linear consumption tax
is imposed, then this result holds only approxi-
mately, i.e., there should be "small" differen-
tial taxes or different commodities, which
depend on third and higher derivatives of the
utility functions.
However, when utility is not separable, a con-
sumption tax is not the only desirable tax; but
whether there should be a subsidy or a tax on
interest income is a moot question; if we simplify
the analysis by assuming a two-period life cycle
model, with individuals working and consuming
the first period, and only consuming the second,
with intertemporal separability in the utility
function, then there should be an interest income
subsidy (tax) if consumption and leisure are
Edgeworth substitutes (complements).
These recent results thus not only cast doubt
both on the generality of the conventional wis-
dom in favor of consumption taxes, and the sig-
nificance of the earlier literature on optimal
indirecttaxation.in which only commodity taxa-
tion at constant rates (as opposed to progressive
consumption or income taxes) was allowed,
but point out the relevant empirieal informa-
tion (e.g.. whether utility is separable between
leisure and goods) necessary to establish the de-
sirable tax structure.
Much recent empirical research has estab-
lished a non-negligible interest elasticity of sav-
ing and wage elasticity of labor supply (see
Boskin, 1977 and Hurd, 1976). Feldstein 1975b
has analyzed the desirability of consumption
taxation in light of this evidence and concludes
that a decrease in capital income taxation is
desirable.
III. Special Provisions: Medical AHowances
The provisions for deductibility of certain ex-
penses and tax credits for others may be analyzed
within the same framework. A tax credit is equi-
valent to a proportional subsidy for the given
good(at least for all individuals paying sufficient
taxes), while deductibility lowers the effective
cost to individuals at a higher marginal bracket
more than those at a lower marginal bracket.
The conventional wisdom on this is that de-
ductability provisions are undesirable (relative
to tax credits) because the differential prices paid
by individuals result in a distortion, and that
because the price is lowered more for the rich
than for the poor, deductibility provisions are
inequitable. Neither argument is convincing: the
tirst represents another misapplication of first-
best economics to a second-best problem. The
second assumes what is to be proven: What is
the appropriate "equitable" tax base? One could
equally well argue that the appropriate tax base
is real income, and that nominal income minus
medical expenses is a better proxy for real in-
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come than nominal income alone. In ihat case,
there is a presumption for tax deductibility,
rather than for a tax credit.
In the analysis referred to in Section II. in-
dividuals differed only with respect m their earn-
ing capacity. If that were the case, then neither
tax deductibility nor a tax credit would be desir-
able (under the assumption of separability). The
argument then for either must be based on a
recognition of individual differences with
respect to medical needs, and a belief that an
ideal tax system (a perfect screening system)
would differentiate the tax burden on people
with different medical situations. The argument
may be put in either ability to pay or utilitarian
ternis: that necessary medical expenses are a
subtraction from the individual's ability to con-
tribute to the support of government services or
that they raise the marginal utility of income
(since they represent a subtraction from "en-
joyable consumption"). An ideal tax system
would thus relate taxes to ability. A. and health
needs;
T* = TiA,H)
where H is health, with T,, < 0. But neither A
nor H is easily observable. We shall analyze the
desirability of the alternative programs within
the utilitarian framework.
Assume that the demand lor medical services
of any given individual is perfectly inelastic; a
particular amount is required just to survive; any
amount beyond that has zero utility. Differences
in these required medical expenses are the only
way in which individuals differ with respect to
H. Then medical expenses would be a perfect
surrogate for H. If we assume that the individ-
ual's indirect utility function can be written in
the form
V{p,l - H)
then the appropriate tax treatment would be to
give a 100 percent tax credit, assuming H.I, and
A are uncorrelated, and assuming that the
government can impose a uniform lump sum tax
(subsidy).
In the realistic case, the demand for health is
not completely inelastic (see Feldstein, !974a).
so that actual expenditures are only a surrogate
for medical needs. But ii has an even more im-
portant implication: allowing a full credit would
i)bviously be extremely distortionary. leading all
individuals to demand medical services up to the
point of satiation. Thus, any tax system must
allow for only partial payment by the govern-
ment of medical expenses.
Indeed, we can view the tax deductibility pro-
vision as u form of partial insurance for medical
expenses; the partial nature of the insurance
arises from the same kinds of considerations
which lead to co-insurance in conventional in-
surance policies—moral hazard. Individuals in
different income brackets are, however, offered
different insurance policies, and an insurance
policy with a nonconstant co-insurance pro-
vision. To the extent that they face the same risks
(in dollar equivalent terms), have the same de-
mand elasticities, and have the same relative
risk aversion, since the risks are smaller relative
to income (wealth) for the wealthier, the return
to having the insurance is smaller while the
deadweighi loss is the same, leading to some
presumption for the wealthier to have less in-
surance, i.e., the government should allow them
a lower tax credit rate (a lower percentage of
their medical expenses being deductible). More-
over, if there is diminishing marginal utility of
consumption ol nonmedical goods, then it
would seem desirable to have a larger fraction of
large medical expenses insured than of small
medical expenses. The tax deductibility pro-
vision works in just the opposite way. providing
smaller marginal co-insurance rates (for a given
income) as expenses go up. This provides some
further argument against deductibility over a tax
credit.
But income may respond to health needs as
well; to compensate for greater medical needs,
an individual may be induced to work harder, in
which case higher incomes do not represent
higher levels of "enjoyment," but only greater
needs. In that case, deductibility is preferable to
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a credit, since income net of medical expenses is
dearly a better measure of welfare than just
income alone.^
This is illustrated by the following simple
model. Let the utilitv function be
(1) W=V{C)+Z{M.H)-VL
where C is "effective" consumption, M is
medieal expenditures. H is health, and L is labor
supplied. Z represents the "direct" utility of
medical expenditures.
In general, effective consumption will be a
function of health, income, and expenditures on
medical care. One simple specification is^
(2)
C equals expenditure on nonmedical items, plus
all expenditures on medicine in excess of health
needs. H. For simplicity, assume / consists of
only labor income minus tax payments,
(3) 1 ^WL- T{WL- kxM) + KM.
7is the tax on income after medical deductions,
T' > 0, T" > 0 {if the tax is progressive), \i is
the percentage deductabiiity allowance and Xg is





The government wishes to choose A.i and X-z • the
percentage deduction and credit allowances, to
maximize
(5) J W{W,H)dF{W,H)
•^ Wc art* concerned here more with ihe consideralion.s
entering the choice beiween a credit and a deduction ihan
with the realism of the model.
••Other specifications, e .g . . C = I-M have similar
results.
[where F is the distribution function of individ-
uals by wage rates (ability) and health needs
(//)] subject to
(6) R =
We thus obtain, letting fx be the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with (6),
(7)
(8)
where e is the price elasticity of the demand for
medicine and where S is Ihe marginal subsidy
rate. Straightforward calculations establish that
{provided Z,w,/ > 0) if A., = 0
dl
Increasing health needs increase medical expen-
ditures and lower effective consumption.
If the only source of variability in M arose
from variations in health needs. H. then it is easy
to establish (assuming the price elasticity of
medicine does not increase wilh health needs)
either only lax deductibility should be allowed or
both a credit and deductibility should be em-
ployed, but a tax credit should never be used
a lone.'^
If, on the other hand, labor is inelastically
supplied (/isfixed), equations (7)and{8)remain
unaffected; but now. if H is the only source of
\ , = 0. Then when (81 lb nonptisitive, (7) is
negative.
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variabihty. then a deductibility provision should
never be used (except if a full credit (A.2 = 1) is
used in addition, whieh, sinee this is equivalent
to giving M away, it never will be)."
Thus, whether the insurance considerations or
equity considerations dominate depends on the
responsiveness of income to health considera-
tions.
Even this analysis, we suspect, overstates the
case for the desirability of a tax credit. Assume
that different inJividuais had inelastic demands
for medical care, but that their demands were
only partially correlated with true health needs.
Assume M and H are jointly normally dis-
tributed, with correlation coefficient p, which is
independent of/. Assume a social welfare func-
tion of the form
W= -H -T(MJ))dF
where F is the distribution function of individ-
uals over H, I. and M, and where T{MJ) is the
tax function which we assume to be of the form
T = T{I - KiM) - \nM. In particular, we
assume U is quadratic. Then it is easy to show
maximizing social welfare requires a deduction
from income of an amount t,M.
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